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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environ-
mental policy stringency in a two-country model with trade costs, where
FDI could be unilateral and bilateral and both governments address local
pollution through environmental taxes. We show that FDI does not give rise
to ecological dumping because the host country has an incentive to shift
rents away from the source country towards the host country. Environmental
policy strategies and welfare eﬀects are studied under the assumption that
parameter values support FDI to be proﬁtable.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: F12, F18, F23.
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, environmental taxes, multinational
enterprises, plant location.5
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Executive summary 
Over the last two decades the global economy has witnessed an unprecedented world-
wide integration of commodity and factor markets. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
contributes substantially to this process because it involves multinational firms setting 
up a plant in a foreign country rather than serving the foreign market via exports. The 
aggregate sales by affiliates of multinational firms have outnumbered aggregate world 
exports since the end of the 1980s, which implies that FDI is a key aspect of 
globalization, even more than trade. For example, the World Investment Report of the 
United Nations estimates sales of foreign affiliates at USD 22.2 trillion in 2005, 
whereas global exports of goods and non-factor services amounted to USD 12.6 trillion 
in the same year. In 1982, conversely, sales of foreign affiliates and global exports were 
of the same magnitude: less than USD 3 trillion. Moreover, the United Nation estimates 
that exports of foreign affiliates rose to USD 4.2 trillion in 2005 from USD 0.6 trillion 
in 1982. This also implies that FDI activity carried out to be closer to foreign markets as 
a substitute of trade (i.e. horizontal FDI) is very important. 
Given this background, several papers have investigated the implication of 
environmental tax policies on firms’ competition and location choice based on race to 
the bottom games, where governments set policies before firms choose location. Most 
of these papers conclude that governments set too low standards or taxes in equilibrium. 
However, the empirical evidence of no significant correlation between location of 
multinational enterprises and environmental standards in host countries challenges this 
race to the bottom argument, though environmental regulation seems to restrict 
industrial activity.
Market share games, where firms choose location before governments set policies, have 
been less used, although there could be situations in which governments’ strategic 
environmental policies are influenced by firms’ location choice. This assumption may 
well reflect the hold-up problem faced by multinational firms and the risks that their 
investment will be expropriated. Even if governments promise to levy low 
environmental taxes from the outset, taxes may be adjusted once the polluting 
multinational firm has set up a plant in the country and can no longer pull out without 
losing its original investment. Governments may be induced by citizens to change 6
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environmental taxation policies once the size of potential pollution becomes public 
knowledge. Therefore, we consider the less investigated case that firms anticipate 
changes in the environmental taxes resulting from their FDI decision under the 
hypothesis that externalities do not spillover to other countries, as in the case of global 
environmental damages. 
How environmental policy is affected by polluting FDI activity? The key important 
finding is that, when FDI is permitted (i.e. FDI liberalization), FDI does not lead to an 
insufficient internalization of externalities created by pollution (i.e. ecological 
dumping), because the host country has an incentive to shift rents away from the source 
country towards the host country by taxing the production of the multinational 
enterprise. This can be achieved only by means of an increase in the tax on polluting 
production activities in the host country. We show that the country hosting FDI would 
introduce a Pigouvian tax rate, which internalises the disutility from a polluted 
environment caused by the FDI activity. 
If FDI is unilateral, the country attracting FDI loses in terms of welfare although its tax 
is at the Pigouvian rate, because FDI deteriorates the competitive position of the 
domestic firm. Conversely, the other country gains if FDI costs are not too large, despite 
insufficient internalization of the negative externality. In this case, each country would 
rather prefer its own firm to become a multinational firm. If FDI is bilateral, the welfare 
effects are identical for both countries, but they depend upon the size of FDI costs. In 
this case, the results support environmentally friendly policy strategies but FDI does not 
necessarily lead to welfare improvement, even though environmental policies react 
endogenously to firms’ behaviour. 7
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades the global economy has witnessed an unprece-
dented world-wide integration of commodity and factor markets. Foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) contributes substantially to this process because it
involves multinational ﬁrms setting up a plant in a foreign country rather
than serving the foreign market via exports. The aggregate sales by aﬃli-
ates of multinational ﬁrms have outnumbered aggregate world exports since
the end of the 1980s, which implies that FDI is a key aspect of globaliza-
tion, even more than trade. For example, the World Investment Report of
the United Nations estimates sales of foreign aﬃliates at USD 22.2 trillion
in 2005, whereas global exports of goods and non-factor services amounted
to USD 12.6 trillion in the same year. In 1982, conversely, sales of foreign
aﬃliates and global exports were of the same magnitude, that is less than
USD 3 trillion. Moreover, the United Nation estimates that exports of foreign
aﬃliates rose to USD 4.2 trillion in 2005 from USD 0.6 trillion in 1982. This
also implies that horizontal FDI, that is serving the foreign markets via FDI
rather than trade, is very important.
Given this background, several papers have investigated the implication of
environmental tax policies on ﬁrms’ competition and location choice based on
race to the bottom games, where governments set policies before ﬁrms choose
location (e.g. Motta and Thisse, 1994, Ulph, 1994, Rauscher, 1995, Beladi,
Chao and Frasca, 1999). Most of these paper conclude that governments set
too low standards or taxes in equilibrium. However, the empirical evidence of
no signiﬁcant correlation between location of multinational enterprises and8
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environmental standards in host countries (Levinson (1996), Letchumanan
and Kodoma, 2000, Smarzynska and Wei, 2001, and Eskeland and Harrison,
2003) challenges this race to the bottom argument, though environmental
regulation seems to restrict industrial activity (Greenstone, 2002). Interest-
ingly, Cole et al. (2006) ﬁnd that FDI leads to a higher (lower) stringency
of environmental policy when the degree of local government corruptibility
is low (high), while Keller and Levinson (2002) ﬁnd evidence that pollution
abatement costs reduce manufacturing FDI only by a small amount.
Market share games, where ﬁrms choose location before governments set
policies, have been less used, although there could be situations in which
governments’ strategic environmental policies are inﬂuenced by ﬁrms’ loca-
tion choice.1 This assumption may well reﬂect the hold-up problem faced by
multinational ﬁrms and the risks that their investment will be expropriated.2
Even if governments promise to levy low environmental taxes from the out-
set, taxes may be adjusted once the polluting multinational ﬁrm has set up a
plant in the country and can no longer pull out without losing its original in-
vestment. Governments may be induced by citizens to change environmental
taxation policies once the size of potential pollution becomes public knowl-
edge. Therefore, we consider the less investigated case that ﬁrms anticipate
changes in the environmental taxes resulting from their FDI decision under
the hypothesis that externalities do not spillover to other countries, as in the
1Ulph and Valentini (2001) compare both models and conclude that ecological dumping
can be larger in the market share game than in the race to the bottom game if damage
costs are convex.
2The FDI literature has extensively discussed the hold-up problem of multinational
ﬁrms when FDI is subject to expropriation risks. For the pioneering paper, see Thomas
and Worrall (1994).9
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case of global environmental damages.
The existing studies considering the market share game ignore trade costs
(see e.g. Hoel, 1997, and Ulph and Valentini, 2001). Therefore, they cannot
study the case where FDI is a substitute for trade, as the existence of an
equilibrium with horizontal FDI requires positive trade costs. Moreover, the
optimal size of exports and FDI in models with horizontal FDI depends on
the size of the trade costs as well as ﬁxed costs. In a nutshell, the novelty of
this paper consists of investigating how environmental policy that is optimal
in a two-country setting with trade costs is aﬀected by horizontal FDI (i.e.,
FDI liberalization) in a market share game.
As pointed out by Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1995) and De Santis
and St¨ ahler (2004), the analysis of FDI and trade under imperfect compe-
tition becomes complex because ﬁrms may change location and number of
their plants, and hence the reaction curves are discontinuous. In this paper,
we tackle these analytical problems and we solve for the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of a three-stage game with positive trade costs, commod-
ity trade and horizontal FDI, where two governments and diﬀerent types of
ﬁrms play Nash. Therefore, the exhaustive characterization of all possible
equilibria is provided.
Under the hypothesis that parameter values are such that FDI is prof-
itable, we show that under FDI liberalization two alternative Nash equilibria
can occur depending upon the size of ﬁxed costs to set up a plant: unilateral
FDI, where one ﬁrm becomes a multinational ﬁrm and the other remains a
national ﬁrm, but it cannot longer export; bilateral FDI where both ﬁrms
become multinational ﬁrms.10
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With regard to the impact on environmental taxation and welfare, the
ﬁrst important ﬁnding is that FDI does not lead to ecological dumping be-
cause the host country has an incentive to shift rents away from the source
country towards the host country. On the contrary, we show that the country
hosting FDI would introduce a Pigouvian tax rate. This result holds for both
types of Nash equilibria. However, if FDI is unilateral, the country attract-
ing FDI loses in terms of welfare although its tax is at the Pigouvian rate.
Conversely, the other country gains if FDI costs are not too large, despite
insuﬃcient internalization of the negative externality. In this case, each coun-
try would rather prefer its own ﬁrm to become a multinational ﬁrm. If FDI is
bilateral, the welfare eﬀects are identical for both countries, but they depend
upon the size of FDI costs. In this case, the results support environmentally
friendly policy strategies but FDI does not necessarily lead to welfare im-
provement, even though environmental policies react endogenously to ﬁrms’
behavior.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the model. Section 3 discusses strategic environmental policies
under intra-industry trade. Section 4 explores the impact of FDI on strategic
environmental policies, trade ﬂows and welfare; and Section 5 summarizes
the results. For convenience, we have relegated to the appendix all technical
details on ﬁrms’ output, proﬁts, pollution and tax revenues.
2 The model
The theoretical model used in this paper is an extension of the model of
Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1995). We consider two countries, a domestic11
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country and a foreign country. All terms associated with the foreign country
are denoted by a star. Both countries are identical with respect to preferences,
endowment and size, and there is only one factor of production, denoted
by L. In both countries, a homogeneous good, denoted by Z, is produced
under perfect competition by using this production factor such that LZ = Z,
where the superscript denotes the sector in which the factor is used. Z is the
numeraire of the model. There is no pollution associated with the production
or consumption of Z, and exporting Z is assumed to raise no trade costs. In
order to keep the structure of the model simple, the consumers’ preferences
in each country are given by the utility function U(X,Z,D)=aX−bX2/2+
Z − D,w h e r eX denotes the consumption of the product produced by the
oligopolistic industry and D the environmental damage, which is a public
bad. We assume an international duopoly for the oligopolistic industry, where
one ﬁrm is located in each country. By using the typical terminology of the
trade literature, we will refer to a ﬁrm which serves the foreign market with
e x p o r t sa sanational ﬁrm, and to a ﬁrm which does it with a plant set up
abroad as a multinational ﬁrm.
Since the consumer structure is atomistic, consumers do not take into ac-
count the eﬀects of their behavior on environmental damage. Each individual
views pollution as exogenous, so that market failure occurs if the externality is
not internalized. Given the aggregate resource constraint L+Π+T = pX+Z,
where Π denotes the proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm, T the domestic tax revenues
and p the price of X in terms of the numeraire, maximization of U subject to
the resource constraint yields the following inverse income inelastic demand12
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function:
p = a − bX. (1)
With regard to the equilibrium in the goods market, let y(y∗)d e n o t et h e
production of the domestic (foreign) ﬁrm for the domestic (foreign) market,
and x(x∗) the production of the foreign (domestic) ﬁrm for the domestic
(foreign) market.3 The equilibrium in the goods market is given by X = x+y
in the domestic country, and by X∗ = x∗ + y∗ in the foreign country. Note
that x(x∗) denotes exports of the foreign (domestic) ﬁrm, if it is a national
ﬁrm, or sales via FDI of the foreign (domestic) ﬁrm, if it is a multinational
ﬁrm.
Regarding the environmental damage, we assume that no international
spillovers exist, and that pollution depends linearly on the level of aggregate
production within the domestic country, Q: D = δQ,w h e r eδ>0 reﬂects
the constant marginal disutility from pollution. It is important to emphasize
that Q = x∗+y, if both ﬁrms are national ﬁrms; Q = x+y,i fb o t hﬁ r m sa r e
multinational ﬁrms; Q = x + x∗ + y, if the domestic ﬁrm is a national ﬁrm
and the foreign ﬁrm is a multinational ﬁrm; and Q = y, if the domestic ﬁrm
is a multinational ﬁrm and the foreign ﬁrm is a national ﬁrm. Needless to
say, the strategically optimal environmental policies will depend on the type
of ﬁrms serving the market.
The international duopoly is characterized by imperfect competition and
Cournot behavior. Each ﬁrm faces a ﬁxed set-up cost and produces one good,
which is traded within the home market and may be exported or produced
3The superscript refers to the destination of the respective production.13
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abroad.4 Exports and FDI are assumed to be perfect substitutes, which im-
plies that we focus our analysis upon horizontal FDI.5 Firms’ production
decisions depend on the ﬁxed costs, the marginal cost c, environmental taxes
t and t∗ and the trade costs s. Governments are not allowed to discriminate
against foreign ﬁrms and markets are segmented in the sense that each ﬁrm
is able to regard each country as a separate market.
The proﬁts of a ﬁrm depends upon the ﬁrm’s type. The proﬁts of the
domestic national ﬁrm, Πn, and of the foreign national ﬁrms, Π∗
n,a r eg i v e n
by (2) and (3); whilst the proﬁts of a domestic multinational ﬁrm, Πm,a n d
of a foreign multinational ﬁrm, Π∗
m,a r eg i v e nb y( 4 )a n d( 5 ) ,r e s p e c t i v e l y :
Πn =( p − c − t)y +( p
∗ − c − t − s)x




∗ − c − t
∗)y
∗ +( p − c − t
∗ − s)x − F − G, (3)
Πm =( p − c − t)y +( p
∗ − c − t
∗)x




∗ − c − t
∗)y
∗ +( p − c − t)x − F − 2G, (5)
where F denotes the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs for headquarters, and G the
plant-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs for setting up a production plant, i.e., the FDI
costs. A national ﬁrm has to carry trade costs s, which depend linearly on
4The benchmark of the model is the trade regime because the autarky case has already
been examined in the literature (see, for example, Ulph, 1995) and we focus on the impact
of FDI. Nevertheless, we will show that environmental policies under autarky coincide with
environmental policies under unilateral FDI in the home country of the multinational ﬁrm
(see subsection 4.2).
5The literature distinguishes between horizontal FDI, which replaces trade, and vertical
FDI, which is complementary to trade. In the horizontal case, a ﬁrm sets up a production
plant in the foreign country to serve the foreign market. In the vertical case, this plant
serves the foreign market as well as the domestic market. In this paper, we assume that
FDI is horizontal, a hypothesis which is also supported by recent empirical evidence (see
Brainard, 1997, Blonigen, 2001, and Markusen and Maskus, 2002). An exhaustive review
can be found in Markusen (2002) and Markusen and Maskus (2003).14
ECB
Working Paper Series No 921
July 2008
exports. This variable collects all costs associated with cross-border activities.
Conversely, the multinational ﬁrm saves the variable trade costs s, but has
to carry the additional ﬁxed costs G to set up a second plant in the other
country. Since we assume that producing the oligopolistic good is proﬁtable
and that each ﬁrm has already sunk F +G, only the additional cost G to set
up a second plant is relevant for welfare comparisons. Therefore, we will no
longer take F + G into account in subsequent sections.
Note that if the ﬁrm serves the foreign market by exporting goods, these
exports will be subject to the domestic environmental tax t; by contrast, if
the ﬁrm serves the foreign market with FDI, the production in the foreign
country will be subject to the foreign environmental tax t∗. Note also that
we assume that governments apply the non-discrimination rule vis-´ a-vis for-
eign companies that is often established in international agreements and is
enshrined in European Union laws.
Given the quasi-linear structure of the utility function, we can measure
welfare by the sum of ﬁrms’ proﬁts, Π, consumer surplus, CS, tax revenues,
the disutility of pollution, and labor income:
W =Π+CS +( t − δ)Q + L. (6)
Note that the proﬁts of the multinational ﬁrm belong to the country where its
headquarters are located. However, this ﬁrm can only transfer proﬁts net of
environmental taxes. These taxes are collected by local governments. Given
the linear inverse demand function (1), consumer surplus is determined by
bX2/2. Expression (6) allows us to derive a simple measure for the internal-
ization of the environmental damage. If the environmental tax rate is such15
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that t = δ, then perfect internalization occurs, because the marginal damage
is equal to the marginal tax rate. This case will be referred to as the Pigou-
vian tax rate. If, instead, the environmental tax rate is such that t<δ ,t h e
tax rate falls short of its Pigouvian level and internalization is incomplete. It
is important to emphasize that this comparison does not allow us to draw any
conclusion concerning welfare, because imperfect competition implies market
distortions, which also have to be taken into account.
3 Environmental policy under trade
For the time being, assume that FDI is banned and that intra-industry trade
takes place between both countries. As shown in Appendix A.2, trade occurs
if 2(a − c) − 2δ − 3s ≥ 0. Under this hypothesis we set up a simple two
stage non-cooperative game between ﬁrms and governments in this section:
in the ﬁrst stage, both governments decide simultaneously on environmental
taxation; in the second stage, both ﬁrms compete ´ a la Cournot. Appendix A.1





2(2(a − c) − 6δ − s)+7 t + t∗
9b
. (7)
The strategic tax rates can be determined by setting (7) equal to zero.
Given the symmetry assumption of the intra-industry trade model, then
˜ tI = ˜ t
∗
I = −
a − c − δ
4   
(I), (-)
−
a − c − s − δ





Expression (8) collects three incentives. Firstly, the government of each
country wishes to correct the distortion existing in its own market, due to16
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the presence of the duopoly (see Barnett, 1980). This incentive alone implies
a subsidy (see term (I) in (8), which corresponds to the classic domestic
correction incentive). Secondly, the government can subsidize exports of
its home ﬁrm in order to shift proﬁts from the foreign country to the
home country (see term (II) in (8), which corresponds to the proﬁt shifting
incentive) already analyzed by Brander and Spencer (1985). Thirdly, the
government has to take into account the externality which is caused by its
own ﬁrm in producing goods to be supplied internally and exported (see
term (III) in (8), which we label as the environmental protection incentive).
The ﬁrst two incentives imply a negative tax, whereas the third incentive
leads to a positive tax. Although the aggregate eﬀect is ambiguous in sign,
the strategic environmental tax rate is lower than the marginal damage.6
Lemma 1 summarizes and proves this result:
Lemma 1: In the case of intra-industry trade, the strategic environ-
mental tax rate is lower than the Pigouvian tax rate.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
We can now compute equilibrium welfare, denoted by a hat, i.e.,
ˆ WI = ˆ W
∗
I =
(a − c − δ)2
2b
−
s(4(a − c − δ) − 5s)
8b
+ L. (9)
We observe that autarky would be an equilibrium if s>2(a − c − δ)/3. Ap-
6A similar result can be also found in Conrad (1996). Note also that the proﬁt shifting
incentive weakens as s increases. This is because high trade costs make proﬁt shifting
more costly, as the home ﬁrm ﬁnds itself at a substantial cost disadvantage in the foreign
country.17
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pendix A.3 shows that welfare is convex in trade costs s, because equilibrium
proﬁts
ˆ ΠI = ˆ Π
∗
I =
(a − c − δ)2
2b
−
s(4(a − c − δ) − 5s)
8b
, (10)
increase as trade costs become larger.7 In the subsequent section, we relax
the assumption that FDI is banned and we take (9) as the benchmark of our
welfare analysis.
4 Environmental policy under trade and FDI
If FDI is liberalized, the game presented in the previous section becomes
more elaborated, because ﬁrms can decide on their long-run investment poli-
cies. Since investment is a long-run decision with a high degree of commit-
ment by ﬁrms, we employ the following three stage game: in the ﬁrst stage,
ﬁrms decide simultaneously on their type; in the second stage, governments
decide simultaneously on environmental taxation; and in the third stage,
ﬁrms compete in the usual Cournot-Nash fashion. Three alternative market
structure equilibria have to be distinguished in the last stage: intra-industry
trade, where both the domestic and the foreign ﬁrm are national ﬁrms; bi-
lateral FDI, where both ﬁrms are multinational ﬁrms; and unilateral FDI,
where one ﬁrm is a multinational ﬁrm and the other ﬁrm is a national ﬁrm.
Strategic environmental taxes, proﬁts and welfare levels have already been
computed for the intra-industry trade case in the previous section. These
variables will be determined for both the bilateral and the unilateral FDI
7The behavior of welfare with trade costs will also be used for proofs in Section 4.18
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equilibria, respectively, in the next two sub-sections.
4.1 The bilateral FDI equilibrium
Assume that parameter values are such that bilateral FDI, denoted by the
subscript B, is proﬁtable. As shown in Appendix A.4, the welfare function
(6) in the bilateral FDI case is equal to
WB =
(a − c − t)2
3b
+
(a − c − t∗)2
9b
+( t − δ)
2(a − c − t)
3b
− G + L. (11)
At the second stage, the social planner has to compute the strategic
environmental tax rate, which maximizes social welfare. The solution is
summarized by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: In the case of bilateral FDI, the strategic environ-
mental tax rate coincides with the Pigouvian tax rate in both countries.
Proof: Maximization of (11) with respect to t leads to ˜ tB = δ. 
Proposition 1 is a surprising result because strategic incentives are
not absent in this setting. The government has the incentive to correct the
market distortions with a subsidy (domestic correction incentive). But, at
the same time, it wishes to tax production of the foreign multinational ﬁrm
in the domestic country. Clearly, the proﬁt shifting incentive is diﬀerent
from that discussed in the intra-industry trade case, because it is not
domestic exports but foreign ”imports” (which are produced in the domestic
country) which are subject to environmental taxation. To a certain extent,19
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the proﬁt shifting incentive is similar to the tariﬀ argument of Brander and
Spencer (1984). Proposition 1 shows that the domestic correction incentive
and the proﬁt shifting incentive oﬀset each other, leaving eﬀective only the
environmental protection incentive.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that FDI does not lead to ecological dumping,
as one might have believed in the ﬁrst place. Given the symmetry of the
bilateral FDI case, equilibrium proﬁts and welfare turn out to be respectively
equal to
ˆ ΠB = ˆ Π
∗
B =
2(a − c − δ)2
9b
− G, (12)
ˆ WB = ˆ W
∗
B =
4(a − c − δ)2
9b
− G + L. (13)
The coincidence of the tax rate with the Pigouvian tax rate depends
crucially on the assumption of linear demand. If the inverse demand function
were convex (concave), the increase in demand induced by a reduction in the
tax would be larger (smaller). Hence, convex (concave) demand would imply a
stronger (weaker) incentive to raise domestic consumption, and the tax would
be larger (lower) than the Pigouvian tax.8 It also depends on the hypothesis
that domestic and foreign ﬁrms are symmetric. Indeed, if the foreign ﬁrm were
relatively more eﬃcient, higher foreign proﬁts would amplify the rent shifting
incentive by the domestic government, but reduce the domestic correction
incentive as the foreign ﬁrm’s output is already relatively larger. Hence, a
diﬀerence in eﬃciency in favor of a foreign ﬁrm would lead to a domestic tax
above the Pigouvian tax. Since we would like to focus on the environmental
protection incentive, we will not explore the asymmetric cases any further.
8For the inﬂuence of consumer preferences on the sign of commodity tax rates, see
Hauﬂer, Schjelderup and St¨ ahler (2005).20
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4.2 The unilateral FDI equilibrium
Assume that parameter values are such that unilateral FDI, denoted by the
subscript U, is proﬁtable. For convenience, assume also that the foreign ﬁrm
is the multinational ﬁrm and the domestic ﬁrm is the national ﬁrm. Under
this scenario, Appendix A.5 can substantiate the following Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: In the case of unilateral FDI, the national ﬁrm does not
export to the home country of the multinational ﬁrm.
Proof: See Appendix A.5.
The basic intuition behind Lemma 2 is that the domestic country’s
proﬁt shifting incentive to tax the multinational ﬁrm harms the potential
exports of the domestic ﬁrm. Furthermore, the domestic correction incentive
in the foreign country deteriorates the competitive position of the domestic
ﬁrm in the foreign market. Lemma 2 suggests that these eﬀects are so strong
that exports are not proﬁtable.
Given Lemma 2, the national ﬁrm is producing only for the home market
and faces competition by the multinational ﬁrm, whilst the foreign multi-
national ﬁrm is a monopolist in its home market. Appendix A.6 shows that
domestic social welfare
˜ WU =
(a − c − t)2
3b
+( t − δ)
2(a − c − t)
3b
+ L, (14)
depends only on the domestic tax rate. Proposition 2 derives the strategically
optimal environmental policy for the domestic country.21
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Proposition 2: In the case of unilateral FDI, the country hosting the
national ﬁrm introduces a strategic environmental tax rate, which coincides
with the Pigouvian tax rate.
Proof: Diﬀerentiating (14) with respect to t yields ˜ tU = δ. 
Proposition 2 and Proposition 1 give the same solution for the domes-
tic country, because the eﬀects are similar. The domestic correction
incentive and the proﬁt shifting incentive compensate each other for the
same reasons already discussed in the previous subsection, such that only
the environmental protection incentive is left. As shown in Appendix A.6,




3(a − c − t∗)2
8b
+




a − c − t∗
2b
− G + L. (15)
Proposition 3 draws the environmental policy conclusion for the foreign
country.
Proposition 3: In the case of unilateral FDI, the country hosting the
multinational ﬁrm introduces an environmental tax which falls short of the
Pigouvian tax rate.
Proof: Diﬀerentiation of (15) with respect to t∗ yields ˜ t∗
U = −(a−c−δ)+δ.
T h i st a xr a t ei sl a r g e rt h a nδ if, and only if, δ>a− c, which would imply
negative exports (see Appendix A.6). 22
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Since the domestic ﬁrm is not in the foreign country and the foreign
activities of the foreign multinational ﬁrm are subject to domestic taxation,
the foreign government balances only two incentives: on the one hand,
it has to correct the market imperfections due to the monopoly power
(domestic correction incentive); on the other hand, it has to internalize
the environmental damage (environmental protection incentive). This is the
reason why the strategic tax rate is lower than the Pigouvian level.9 Note
that ˜ t∗
U = −(a−c−δ)+δ is also the tax rate which we would observe under
autarky. Since the foreign ﬁrm faces no competition in its home market,
business conditions for the foreign ﬁrm in the home market do not diﬀer
between unilateral FDI and autarky. Note also that ˜ t∗
U < ˜ t∗
I.
The results of Propositions 2 and 3 allow to compute the equilibrium
values of domestic and foreign proﬁts and of domestic and foreign welfare,
respectively:
ˆ ΠU =










(a − c − δ)2
3b
+ L, ˆ W
∗
U =
11(a − c − δ)2
18b
− G + L. (18)
9Note that Proposition 3 does not necessarily imply a subsidy. The tax rate is positive
if δ<a − c<2δ. Note also that the tax structure described by Proposition 2 and
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4.3 Equilibrium FDI
In the two previous subsections, we have only considered the eﬀects of bi-
lateral and unilateral FDI on environmental taxation. But we have not yet
shown whether and under which conditions FDI is a Nash equilibrium. To
determine the Nash equilibrium, we have to examine the best responses of
ﬁrms to various strategy choices. Table 1 shows the payoﬀ matrix of proﬁts
in the ﬁrst stage where proﬁts refer to (10), (12), (16) and (17).10 The left
(right) box on the upper (lower) line gives the proﬁts in case of intra-industry
trade (bilateral FDI) whereas the other boxes give the unilateral FDI cases.
Table 1: Payoﬀ matrix
Foreign ﬁrm
Trade FDI
Domestic Trade (ˆ ΠI, ˆ Π∗
I)( ˆ ΠU, ˆ Π∗
U)
ﬁrm FDI (ˆ Π∗
U, ˆ ΠU)( ˆ ΠB, ˆ Π∗
B)
Suppose that the foreign ﬁrm wishes to make an investment, i.e., it considers
to move from the left to the right on the upper line of Table 1. Then, it would
have an incentive to do so if, and only if, its proﬁts under intra-industry trade
are not larger than its proﬁts under unilateral FDI, taking into account that
it will then face a Pigouvian tax in the domestic country and a tax according
to Proposition 3 at home. Namely, a ﬁrm has an incentive to become a
multinational ﬁrm if expression (10) is not larger than expression (17). Both
terms are equal if G is equal to:
10Payoﬀs are denoted by (domestic proﬁt, foreign proﬁt). Due to symmetry, (un-)starred
terms may also give domestic (foreign) proﬁts.24
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G1 =
11(a − c − δ)2
18b
+ s
4(a − c − δ) − 5s
8b
, (19)
such that if G is lower than G1, then at least one ﬁrm becomes a multinational
ﬁrm. However, G ≤ G1 does not describe a complete equilibrium behavior,
because the other ﬁrm may do the same. Deﬁne
G3 =
(a − c − δ)2
9b
, (20)
in order to demonstrate that the other ﬁrm may not follow in equilibrium.11
Proposition 4: The Nash equilibrium of the ﬁrst-stage game is as
follows:
i if G<G 3, then it is a dominant strategy of each ﬁrm to set up a plant
in the other country;
ii if G>G 1, then it is a dominant strategy for each ﬁrm not to set up a
plant in the other country;
iii if G3 <G<G 1, then there are two asymmetric Nash equilibria in
which one ﬁrm sets up a plant in the other country and the other ﬁrm
does not.
Proof: The proof can be given by checking the one-shot deviation property of
an asymmetric equilibrium. Suppose that G is not larger than G1, so that the
foreign ﬁrm is better oﬀ by investing abroad, given that the other domestic
ﬁrm is a national ﬁrm. Then, the domestic ﬁrm has also an incentive to
11G2 and G4 will be introduced when discussing welfare eﬀects.25
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become a multinational ﬁrm if (16) is not larger than (12), that is, it then
prefers to move from top to down in the second column of Table 1. Note
that the domestic ﬁrm takes into account that Pigouvian taxation will be
introduced in both countries in this case. The equality between (16) and (12)
gives a critical level of ﬁxed costs which is equal to G3:i fG is larger (less)
than G3, then the domestic ﬁrm will refrain from (go for) an FDI policy.
Hence, the proof for the existence of an asymmetric equilibrium is complete
if G1 >G 3. The latter inequality means that a non-empty range for G exists
so that one ﬁrm becomes a multinational ﬁrm and the other ﬁrm remains a
national ﬁrm. The diﬀerence between G1 and G3 proves that this is in fact
true:
G1 − G3 =
4(a − c − δ)2 + s(4(a − c − δ) − 5s)
8b
> 0.  (21)
Although countries are symmetric, a Nash equilibrium with an asymmet-
ric industry structure and asymmetric environmental tax rates may exist.
Proposition 4 is by no means a trivial conclusion, especially as an asym-
metric equilibrium can never exist, if tax rates are exogenously ﬁxed and
symmetric because symmetric tax rates imply symmetric behavior of both
ﬁrms.12 However, if ﬁrms can anticipate the eﬀects of FDI on tax rates,
diﬀerent proﬁtability conditions imply the possibility of an asymmetric equi-
librium. In summary, if G ≤ G3, the unique Nash equilibrium is given by
bilateral FDI. However, if G3 <G≤ G1, the Nash equilibrium is represented
by unilateral FDI. Note that either the domestic ﬁrm or the foreign ﬁrm be-
12The proof is available upon request.26
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comes multinational. Therefore, two asymmetric Nash equilibra characterize
the unilateral FDI case.
4.4 FDI and welfare
With regard to welfare in the unilateral FDI case, an asymmetric equilibrium
can be expected to imply asymmetric welfare eﬀects. Deﬁne
G2 =
(a − c − δ)2
9b
+ s
4(a − c − δ) − 5s
8b
, (22)
for which G3 <G 2 <G 1, in order to demonstrate the welfare eﬀects of FDI.
Proposition 5: If unilateral FDI replaces the trade regime, the wel-
fare of the country hosting the national ﬁrm deteriorates. If G ∈ [G2,G 1],
the welfare of the country hosting the headquarters of the multinational ﬁrm
declines, if G ∈ [G3,G 2], the welfare of the country hosting the headquarters
of the multinational ﬁrm improves.
Proof: Compare (18) with (9). The switch from intra-industry trade
to unilateral FDI is welfare improving for the country hosting the national
ﬁrm if, and only if, ˆ WU in (18) is larger than ˆ WI in (9), which implies that
s
4(a − c − δ) − 5s
8b
−
(a − c − δ)2
6b
> 0. (23)
Appendix A.3 shows that s[4(a − c − δ) − 5s]/8b is smaller than or equal to
(a − c − δ)2/10b (see (A.9) and (A.10)), which is in contradiction with (23).
The country hosting the multinational ﬁrm is worse (better) oﬀ if ˆ W ∗ in (18)27
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is less (larger) than ˆ W ∗ in (9), which implies that
G>(<)
(a − c − δ)2
9b
+ s
4(a − c − δ) − 5s
8b
= G2.  (24)
We observe from Proposition 5 that one country may gain, whereas the other
country deﬁnitely loses if unilateral FDI is the Nash equilibrium. This is
because the proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm decline due to the lack of exports,
whereas the proﬁts of the foreign ﬁrm increase because it no longer faces
competition at home. In addition, the dumping eﬀect of trade costs for the
foreign consumer is annulled, whereas the domestic consumer has to carry an
additional plant-speciﬁc ﬁxed cost. Note that the country which imposes the
Pigouvian environmental taxation internalizes the environmental damage,
but is worse oﬀ in terms of social welfare. Conversely, the other country
chooses a lower tax rate, but can be better oﬀ if the ﬁxed costs of FDI are
not too large. In this case, each country would rather prefer its own ﬁrm to
become a multinational ﬁrm, even at the cost of insuﬃcient environmental
regulation.
For the case of bilateral FDI, deﬁne
G4 = s
4(a − c − δ) − 5s
8b
−
(a − c − δ)2
18b
. (25)
Note that G4 <G 3 (see (20)) and that the sign of G4 depends on param-
eter values.13 Proposition 6 summarizes the welfare results if FDI is bilateral.
Proposition 6: If bilateral FDI replaces the trade regime and G4 > 0,F D I
13G4 > (<)0 if s>(<)2(a − c − δ)/15.28
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is welfare enhancing if G<G 4 but welfare reducing if G ∈ [G4,G 3].I f
G4 < 0, FDI is welfare reducing.
Proof: Bilateral FDI compared to intra-industry trade does not lead
to welfare losses, if expression (13) is larger than or equal to expression (9).
This is the case if
G ≤ s
4(a − c − δ) − 5s
8b
−
(a − c − δ)2
18b
= G4 .
Under bilateral FDI, the strategic tax rates are always positive. Due to these
high rates, ﬁrms produce less and make less proﬁts aﬀecting social welfare
negatively, despite the fact that the detrimental reciprocal dumping eﬀect
would not materialize. However, if the plant-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs are suﬃciently
small and G4 > 0, then FDI liberalization would result in mutual welfare
gains because the lack of the reciprocal dumping eﬀect would dominate the
negative aggregate ﬁxed costs eﬀect.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has discussed strategic environmental taxation policies in a non-
cooperative model of potential intra-industry trade and FDI with positive
trade costs, where pollution cannot spill-over to other countries, the location
of plants is endogenous and decisions on FDI are prior to environmental reg-
ulation. This assumption may reﬂect the hold-up problem of polluting multi-
national ﬁrms, which anticipate that environmental taxes can be changed
once they have entered the country. Environmental policies are no longer
taken as given by ﬁrms, since ﬁrms’ behavior can aﬀect policy decisions.29
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We have taken the case of intra-industry trade as the point of departure
of our analysis. Due to imperfect competition, intra-industry trade implies
taxes which fall short of the Pigouvian level, because governments have the
incentive to correct domestic distortion and to promote exports with lower
taxes. If FDI is liberalized, the model shows that FDI does not lead to eco-
logical dumping. On the contrary, governments are tempted to levy higher
taxes against polluting foreign multinationals in order to shift rents away
from the source country towards the host country.
We ﬁnd that two types of equilibria are possible in the presence of FDI,
depending on the size of plant-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs: (i) one with unilateral
FDI, where one ﬁrm is a multinational ﬁrm, and the other is a national,
not-exporting ﬁrm; (ii) and one with bilateral FDI, where both ﬁrms are
multinational. If FDI is unilateral, the impact on welfare is negative for the
home country of the national ﬁrm and positive for the home country of the
multinational ﬁrm only if plant-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs are not too large. This
is because the proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm decline as a result of a lack of
exports, whereas the proﬁts of the foreign ﬁrm increase because it no longer
faces competition at home. If, on the other hand, FDI is bilateral, the impact
on welfare for both countries will depend on the size of plant-speciﬁc ﬁxed
costs. In this case, larger aggregate ﬁxed costs have to be borne by ﬁrms even
though the dumping eﬀect of trade costs is annulled.
Furthermore, we show that the country attracting FDI introduces a
Pigouvian environmental tax, whereas the country served by the local ﬁrm
only, regardless of whether it is a national ﬁrm or a multinational ﬁrm, levies
a lower tax rate. Ecological dumping is therefore more likely to occur in the30
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absence of FDI because in that case the traditional strategic proﬁt-shifting
incentive would become dominant. Conversely, in the presence of FDI, the
strategic proﬁt-shifting incentive implies higher taxes in order to shift proﬁts
from the foreign multinational ﬁrm to the domestic country.
In summary, the impact of FDI on strategic environmental policies - when
pollution cannot spillover to other countries - seems to imply a tendency to
higher rather than to lower environmental taxes, challenging therefore the
known results of the race to the bottom game.
Appendix
A.1 Trade without FDI
By using (1), (2) and (3), the f.o.c.’s describing ﬁrms’ behavior imply the
following equilibrium output levels in the intra-industry trade equilibrium,
denoted by the subscript I:
yI =
a − c − 2t + t∗ + s
3b
,x I =






a − c − 2t + t∗ − 2s
3b
,
which can then be used to compute equilibrium consumer surplus and equi-
librium proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm and its change with t as follows:
 CSI =
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Similarly, the equilibrium output levels can be used to determine the tax
revenues corrected by the environmental damage and its change with t as
follows:
˜ TI − ˜ DI =( t − δ)
2(a − c) − s − 4t +2 t∗
3b
, (A.6)
∂(˜ TI − ˜ DI)
∂t
=
2(a − c − 4t + t∗ +2 δ) − s
3b
. (A.7)
Social welfare (6) in the intra-industry trade equilibrium, WI, is then the
sum of (A.2), (A.4) and (A.6), and adding up (A.3), (A.5) and (A.7) leads
to (7).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of Lemma 1 can be given by contradiction. By inserting (8) into
(A.1), we can determine the necessary condition for exports, x∗
I,t ob ep o s i -
tive. This is the case if
2(a − c) − 2δ − 3s ≥ 0. (A.8)
If ˜ tI = ˜ t∗
I ≥ δ, by using (8), 2(a−c)−2δ −3s ≤− 2s<0, which given (A.8)
would imply x∗
I < 0. 
A.3 Welfare under intra-industry trade with trade costs
Welfare is convex in trade costs s and decreases (increases) with s,i fs is
lower (larger) than 2(a−c−δ)/5. Since only the second term in (9) depends
on s, we may concentrate our analysis on its behavior:
Σ(s): =




4(a − c) − 4δ − 10s
8b
,Σ
   < 0. (A.9)
Σ has a maximum at ¯ s =2 ( a − c − δ)/5. Since exports are proﬁtable only if
s ≤ 2(a−c−δ)/3, then ¯ s is within the relevant range. The maximum of the32
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function Σ is given by
Σ(¯ s)=
(a − c − δ)2
10b
. (A.10)
This implies that the value of the function ˆ WI(¯ s)= ˆ W ∗
I (¯ s) is a minimum. The
potential welfare losses of intra-industry trade with a ﬁxed market structure
have already been demonstrated by Brander and Krugman (1983) in a model
without any policy intervention.
A.4 Bilateral FDI
At the third stage, given the inverse demand function (1), the maximization
of (4) and (5) yield the following equilibrium output levels in the domestic
country
yB = xB =





(2(a − c − t))2
9b
, (A.12)
the diﬀerence between tax revenues and damage
˜ TB − ˜ DB =( t − δ)(yB + xB)=( t − δ)
2(a − c − t)
3b
, (A.13)
and, given the symmetry assumption, the domestic proﬁts
˜ ΠB =
(a − c − t)2 +( a − c − t∗)2
9b
− G. (A.14)
Adding (A.12), (A.13) and (A.14) yields (11).
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
Contrary to Lemma 2, suppose that exports of the national ﬁrm are posi-
tive. In this case, given the f.o.c.’s, the production which takes place in the33
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domestic country is given by
yU = xU =










3(a − c) − 4t + t∗ − 2s
3b
. (A.16)
Welfare can then be easily computed as
˜ WU =
2(a − c − t)2
9b
+
(a − c − t)2 +( a − c − 2t + t∗ − 2s)2
9b
+(t − δ)
3(a − c) − 4t + t∗ − 2s
3b
+ L, (A.17)
where the ﬁrst term represents the consumer surplus, the second term col-
lects the proﬁts of the national ﬁrm, and the third term gives the diﬀerence
between tax revenues and environmental damage. With regard to the the






a − c − 2t∗ + t + s
3b
. (A.18)
Given (A.15) and (A.18), the sum of consumer surplus, proﬁts, tax revenues,




(2(a − c) − s − t − t∗)2
18b
+





a − c − 2t∗ + t + s
3b
+ L. (A.19)
Diﬀerentiation of (A.19) with respect to t∗ yields
˜ t
∗
U = −(a − c)+2 δ. (A.20)34
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Given (A.20), t ≤ δ − s must hold for x∗
U ≥ 0. Maximization of (A.17) s.t.
t ≤ δ − s yields the corner solution
˜ tU = δ − s, (A.21)
and proves that a domestic policy which implies x∗
U = 0 is optimal. 
A.6 Unilateral FDI
The proﬁt maximizing f.o.c.’s allow us to determine the following production,
consumption and pollution levels in the domestic market:
xU = yU =
a − c − t
3b
,P U = XU =
2(a − c − t)
3b
, (A.22)
which can be used to determine the proﬁts of the domestic national ﬁrm
˜ ΠU =
(a − c − t)2
9b
, (A.23)
Consumer surplus is equal to
CS =
2(a − c − t)2
9b
, (A.24)
and the diﬀerence between tax revenues and damages amounts to
T − D =( t − δ)
2(a − c − t)
3b
. (A.25)
Adding up (A.23), (A.24) and (A.25) yields domestic welfare (14). Since the
foreign multinational ﬁrm does not face any competition from the national
ﬁrm, the equilibrium output of the foreign ﬁrm for the foreign market is given
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(a − c − t)2
9b
+
(a − c − t∗)2
4b
− G. (A.27)
Note that the ﬁrst term gives the proﬁts realized in the domestic country and
the second term gives the monopoly proﬁts realized in the foreign country.
Finally, collecting proﬁts, consumer surplus
CS
∗ =
(a − c − t∗)2
8b
, (A.28)





a − c − t∗
2b
, (A.29)
yields foreign welfare (15).
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